Area Navigation
Area Navigation (RNAV) permits aircraft operation on any desired flight path within the coverage of ground or space-based navigation aids.
Introduction
Introduction
- As air travel has evolved, methods of navigation have improved to give operators more flexibility
- PBN exists under the umbrella of area navigation (RNAV) [Figure 1]
- The term RNAV in this context, as in procedure titles, just means "area navigation," regardless of the equipment capability of the aircraft
- Many operators have upgraded their systems to obtain the benefits of PBN
- Within PBN there are two main categories of navigation methods:
Area navigation (RNAV):
- In this context, the term RNAV "x" means a specific navigation specification with a specified lateral accuracy value
- For an aircraft to meet the requirements of PBN, a specified RNAV or RNP accuracy must be met 95 percent of the flight time
Required navigation performance (RNP):
- RNP is an RNAV system that includes onboard performance monitoring and alerting capability (for example, Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM))
- PBN also introduces the concept of navigation specifications (Nav Specs) which are a set of aircraft and aircrew requirements needed to support a navigation application within a defined airspace concept
- For both RNP and RNAV NavSpecs, the numerical designation refers to the lateral navigation accuracy in nautical miles which is expected to be achieved at least 95 percent of the flight time by the population of aircraft operating within the airspace, route, or procedure
- This information is detailed in International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) Doc 9613, Performance-based Navigation (PBN) Manual and the latest FAA AC 90-105, Approval Guidance for RNP Operations and Barometric Vertical Navigation in the U.S. National Airspace System and in Remote and Oceanic Airspace
Pilots and Air Traffic Controllers Recognizing Interference or Spoofing
Pilots and Air Traffic Controllers Recognizing Interference or Spoofing
- The low-strength data transmission signals from GPS satellites are vulnerable to various anomalies that can significantly reduce the reliability of the navigation signal. Because of the many uses of GPS in aviation (e.g., navigation, ADS-B, terrain awareness/warning systems), operators of aircraft using GPS need to be aware of these vulnerabilities, and be able to recognize and adjust to degraded signals. Aircraft should have additional navigation equipment for their intended route
- GPS signals are vulnerable to intentional and unintentional interference from a wide variety of sources, including radars, microwave links, ionosphere effects, solar activity, multi-path error, satellite communications, GPS repeaters, and even some systems onboard the aircraft. In general, these types of unintentional interference are localized and intermittent. Of greater and growing concern is the intentional and unauthorized interference of GPS signals by persons using "jammers" or "spoofers" to disrupt air navigation by interfering with the reception of valid satellite signals
- The U.S. government regularly conducts GPS tests, training activities, and exercises that interfere with GPS signals. These events are geographically limited, coordinated, scheduled, and advertised via GPS and/or WAAS NOTAMS. Operators of GPS aircraft should always check for GPS and/or WAAS NOTAMS for their route of flight
- GPS is a critical component of essential communication, navigation, and surveillance (CNS) in the NAS; and flight safety/control systems. Additionally, some satellite communications avionics use GPS signals for operations in oceanic and remote airspaces. It is the sole aircraft position-reporting source for Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B). Some business aircraft are using GPS as a reference source for aircraft flight control and stability systems. GPS is also a necessary component of the Aircraft Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) - an aircraft safety system that alerts pilots of upcoming terrain. There are examples of false "terrain-pull up" warnings during GPS anomalies
- When flying IFR, pilots should have additional navigation equipment for their intended route to crosscheck their position. Routine checks of position against VOR or DME information, for example, could help detect a compromised GPS signal. Pilots transitioning to VOR navigation in response to GPS anomalies should refer to the Chart Supplement U.S. to identify airports with available conventional approaches associated with the VOR Minimum Operational Network (MON) program. (Reference AIM 1-1-3f)
- When flying GPS approaches, particularly in IMC, pilots should have a backup plan in the event of GPS anomalies. Although the appropriate response will vary with the situation, in general pilots should:
- Maintain control of the aircraft
- Use the last reliable navigation information as the basis for initial headings, and climb above terrain
- Change to another source of navigation, if available (i.e., VOR, DME radar vectors)
- Contact ATC as soon as practical
- Pilots should promptly notify ATC if they experience GPS anomalies. Pilots should not normally inform ATC of GPS interference or outages when flying through a known NOTAMed testing area, unless they require ATC assistance. (See 1-1-13)
- For more information, check out this GNSS Intentional Administration Interference and Spoofing report
Conclusion
Conclusion
- Remember, the FAA requests user reports on NAVAID outages
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References
References
- Federal Aviation Administration - Pilot/Controller Glossary
- Aeronautical Information Manual (1-1-17) Global Positioning System
- Aeronautical Information Manual (1-1-18) Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)
- Aeronautical Information Manual (1-2-1) General
- Aeronautical Information Manual (1-2-3) Use of Suitable Area Navigation (RNAV) Systems on Conventional Procedures and Routes
- GPS.Gov